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 Abstract  
Economists draw important lessons for modern development from the medieval 
Maghribi traders who, it has been argued, enforced contracts collectively through a 
closed, private-order coalition. We show that this view is untenable. Not a single 
empirical example adduced as evidence of the putative coalition shows that any 
coalition actually existed. Furthermore, the Maghribis entered business associations 
with non-Maghribis and used formal enforcement mechanisms. The Maghribi traders 
cannot be used to argue that the social capital of exclusive, private-order networks 
will facilitate exchange in developing economies. Nor do they provide any support for 
the cultural theories of economic development and institutional change for which they 
have been mobilised. 
 
 
JEL Code: O17. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Economists frequently refer to historical institutions when discussing social 
capital and the institutional determinants of economic development. They draw far-
reaching lessons in particular from Greif’s portrayal of the eleventh-century Maghribi 
traders (1989b, 1993, 2006). Greif claims that the Maghribis lacked effective legal 
contract enforcement, and instead developed an informal enforcement mechanism 
based on collective relationships within a closely-knit and exclusive group. Greif also 
claims that the Maghribis held ‘collectivist’ Judaeo-Muslim beliefs and norms which 
led them to develop different institutions from their ‘individualistic’ Christian 
counterparts. In Greif’s account, and that of some other economists, these claims 
exemplify the feasibility of private alternatives to the public legal system as a basis 
for economic transactions, the key role of social capital and informal institutions in 
developing economies, and the centrality of cultural differences to institutional and 
economic development. But is Greif’s portrayal of the Maghribi traders accurate? 
According to Greif, the Maghribis were a distinct group of Jewish traders from 
the ‘Muslim West’ – centred in Tunisia – who by the eleventh century were trading 
throughout the Muslim Mediterranean, from Spain to Syria and Palestine.1 A 
Maghribi trader in one location, say Fustat (Old Cairo) in Egypt, could greatly reduce 
his costs by arranging for a Maghribi trader in another location, say Palermo in Sicily, 
to act as his agent in selling his goods in Palermo. But distance and delays in 
communication meant that any agent had scope for opportunistic behaviour: the 
Palermo agent, for example, might tell the Fustat principal that his goods had sold at a 
lower price than the agent actually received, and pocket the difference. For such 
                                                 
1
 Greif (1989b), 861-2. Goitein (1967), 43, describes ‘al-Maghreb’ (‘the Muslim West’) as including 
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Sicily, and Spain. 
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business associations to be feasible, distant traders needed some way of preventing 
such behaviour. 
The formal legal institutions available to the Maghribi merchants were 
inadequate for this purpose, according to Greif.2 Instead, he claims, the Maghribi 
traders developed an informal enforcement mechanism based on repeated interactions 
and collective punishments. Greif calls this mechanism a coalition, which he defines 
as  
a non-anonymous organizational framework through which agency relations 
are established only among agents and merchants with a specific identity 
(‘coalition members’). Relations among the coalition members are governed 
by an implicit contract which states that each coalition merchant will employ 
only member agents ... Moreover, all coalition merchants agree never to 
employ an agent who cheated while operating for a coalition member.3 
 
Greif contends that the Maghribi traders satisfied the conditions of a well-defined 
group with good information flows that would be necessary for such an informal 
enforcement mechanism to be effective: 
The common religious-ethnic origin of the traders provided the natural 
boundaries for the coalition and served as a signal where information 
regarding past conduct could be obtained, while the commercial and social ties 
within the coalition served as a network for the transmission of information.4 
 
Greif’s portrayal of Maghribi contract enforcement is routinely cited in the 
economics literature as showing that, when monitoring is imperfect and formal 
enforcement limited, economic transactions can be sustained by long-term personal 
relationships within a well-defined group.5 It is also frequently used to argue that 
complex economic transactions do not require public legal mechanisms: the 
                                                 
2
 Greif (1989b), 857, 865-6. 
3
 Greif (1989b), 867-8. 
4
 Greif (1989b), 882. 
5
 Costa and Kahn (2007), 1470; Helpman (2004), 117-8; Kranton and Minehart (2001), 500; La Ferrara 
(2003), 1731; MacLeod (2007), 614; Sobel (2006), 273. 
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Maghribis are portrayed as an exemplar of a private-order enforcement method that 
can substitute for the legal system.6 
Greif’s view of the Maghribis has also strongly influenced the literature on the 
role of social capital in economic development. In the absence of formal institutions 
to support market-based exchange, it is claimed, closely-knit and multi-stranded 
social networks generate a social capital of norms, information and sanctions that 
provide an alternative framework within which exchange can develop. The Maghribi 
traders’ coalition is viewed as a prime example of social capital actually working in 
this way. Thus, for instance, the World Bank begins the 2002 World Development 
Report, entitled Building Institutions for Markets, with Greif’s description of the 
Maghribi traders’ coalition, which is claimed to hold important lessons for modern 
developing countries.7 In their chapter on social capital for the Handbook of Economic 
Growth, Durlauf and Fafchamps refer to the Maghribis as an example of ‘the role of 
social networks in circulating information about breach of contract, thereby enabling 
business groups to penalize and exclude cheaters’.8 In discussing social capital and 
industrialization, Miguel et al. adduce the Maghribi traders as an example of how 
‘social networks can also provide access to distant markets and permit transactions 
that are separated in time and space’.9  
The Maghribi traders also provide the central prop for a particular theory of 
how culture determines economic development. Greif hypothesizes that the Maghribis 
held collectivist cultural beliefs which led them to develop contract-enforcement 
mechanisms based on collective sanctions, while the merchants of medieval Italian 
cities such as Genoa held individualistic cultural beliefs which led them instead to 
                                                 
6
 Clay (1997), 203, 207-08, 214 226; Faille (2007); Greif (1989b), 866; Greif (2006), 58-90; McMillan 
and Woodruff (2000), 2626, 2433-5; O’Driscoll and Hoskins (2006), 476.  
7
 World Bank (2002), ‘Overview’, 1, 3, 5-6. 
8
 Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005), 1653. 
9
 Miguel et al. (2005), 757. 
  4 
develop formal legal mechanisms.10 The Genoese use of formal legal enforcement is 
supposed to have generated further institutional innovations that promoted economic 
growth, while the Maghribis’ reliance on trust within their closed social network 
stifled the institutional adaptations needed for long-term development. This 
hypothesised cultural contrast between Maghribi and Genoese merchants is now often 
adduced as evidence that beliefs and norms are the linchpin of institutional formation 
and economic development.11 North, for instance, endorses the view that cultural 
beliefs determine institutions and growth, echoing Greif on how the Maghribis 
developed in-group social communication networks to enforce collective 
action, which, while effective in relatively small homogeneous ethnic groups, 
do not lend themselves to the impersonal exchange that arises from the 
growing size of markets and diverse ethnic traders. In contrast the Genoese 
developed bilateral enforcement mechanisms which entailed the creation of 
formal legal and political organizations for monitoring and enforcing 
agreements – an institutional/organizational path that permitted and led to 
more complex trade and exchange.12  
 
Aoki buttresses his general theory of institutions as self-sustaining systems of ‘shared 
beliefs’ by referring to Greif’s account of how collectivist beliefs caused the 
Maghribis to choose institutions which ultimately circumscribed the capacity of their 
economy to develop.13 
Greif’s portrayal of the Maghribis is thus widely cited. Given its central role in 
theories of social capital, modern development, and institutional change, it is 
important to be sure it is accurate. Yet to the best of our knowledge there has been no 
systematic, critical assessment of the empirical basis for it.14 This paper provides such 
an assessment. 
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 Greif (1994); Greif (2006), 269-304. 
11
 As argued by Greif (2006), 15-23, 39, 45. 
12
 North (2005), 136. 
13
 Aoki (2001), e.g. 10, 73. 
14
 However, criticisms of a number of individual aspects of Greif’s claims have been advanced in 
Ackerman-Lieberman (2007), 2-3, 104, 122-3, 125, 133, 136, 195-7; Goldberg (2005), 31, 37, 131, 
  5 
2. Is There Direct Evidence of a Coalition? 
 
In evaluating the direct evidence adduced by Greif to demonstrate the 
existence of a Maghribi traders’ coalition, it is important to recognise two things in 
advance. First, no evidence exists for the claim that there was a distinct subgroup of 
Maghribi merchants who ‘rarely establish[ed] agency relations with non-Maghribi 
Jewish traders’.15 The merchants discussed by Greif were those whose papers were 
deposited in the Geniza (storeroom) of the synagogue in Old Cairo (Fustat). Some 
(but not all) of these merchants had migrated to Fustat from the Maghreb, or their 
ancestors had done so, and some (but not all) of their trading ties were with merchants 
in the Maghreb. But Geniza scholars have not identified a separate subset of 
merchants of Maghribi descent who avoided agency relations with non-Maghribis. 
Goldberg points out that Greif does not cite any instance in which a merchant requests 
a commercial task of a ‘Maghribi’, and notes that she finds no such instances, 
therefore preferring the term ‘Geniza merchants’ to ‘Maghribi traders’.16 Toch also 
objects to the term ‘Maghribi traders’ on the grounds that ‘it is clearly formulated 
with reference to [Greif’s] model and also suggests that these people were settled in 
the Maghreb or even that they only traded there’, neither of which was the case.17 
Although for simplicity we will continue to use Greif’s term ‘Maghribi traders’, 
analytically it is important to recognize that the Geniza merchants did not consist of a 
                                                                                                                                            
152-8, 162-3, 177-80, 185, 223 with fn 34, 243-4, 305 with fn 141; Harbord (2006), 2-5, 28-9; Toch 
(2008), 1-6; and Trivellato (2006), 3-4. 
15
 As asserted by Greif (2008), 25, reiterating claims advanced in Greif (1989a), 104-05.  
16
 Goldberg (2005), 177-80; Goldberg (2008), 11, footnote 84.  
17
 Toch (2008), 2-3. 
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cohesive group of Maghribis who avoided agency ties with non-Maghribi Jews (or 
even, as we shall see, with non-Jews).18  
The second thing to recognize in advance is that evidence of the importance of 
reputational considerations does not, on its own, constitute evidence that the Maghribi 
traders operated a coalition. The importance of reputation in business relationships 
can arise from several types of repeated interaction between parties. It does not occur 
solely when there are repeated interactions between different members of a well-
defined group which imposes collective punishments on opportunists. Evidence that 
reputation was important to the Maghribis is not, therefore, evidence that there was a 
Maghribi traders’ coalition. 
A number of the cases cited by Greif as providing evidence of the existence of 
a coalition in fact simply show the importance of reputation. For example, Greif 
supports his claim that there was a coalition by quoting the statement made by Yūsuf 
b. ‘Awkal in Fustat (Egypt) to Samh ūn b. Da’ūd in Qayrawān (Tunisia), saying that 
‘if your handling of my business is correct, then I shall send you goods’,19 and by 
describing how buyers in Sfax (Tunisia) eventually agreed to pay the originally-
agreed higher price for flax because of concern about their ‘honour’.20 But these 
quotations merely show that reputational considerations were important in 
relationships between Maghribi traders and do not show anything about the possible 
existence of a coalition.  
There are exactly five cases adduced by Greif which hold the possibility of 
furnishing direct evidence of something resembling the hypothesised coalition as 
                                                 
18
 Gil (2004b), 151, to whom Greif refers for support in this context, merely states that ‘the merchants 
who wrote the letters we have before us were a separate and well-defined group among the Jewish 
population’. Gil does not say that this group of merchants consisted solely of Maghribis, and neither he 
nor any other Geniza scholar finds evidence that merchants of Maghribi descent refrained from forming 
long-distance trading associations with other Jewish merchants. 
19
 Greif (1989b), 869. 
20
 Greif (1989b), 870. 
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distinct from merely demonstrating the existence of repeated interactions between 
particular parties.21 Since these are the only such examples provided by Greif, we 
consider each of them in some detail. 
The first case is that of Abūn b. S adaqa. According to Greif, a letter written in 
1055 by Abūn, who lived in Jerusalem, shows that he ‘was accused (although not 
charged in court) of embezzling the money of a Maghribi trader. When word of this 
accusation reached other Maghribi traders, merchants as far away as Sicily cancelled 
their agency relations with him.’22 Greif claims that this collective punishment was 
effective: ‘only after a compromise was achieved and he [Abūn] had compensated the 
offended merchant were commercial relations with him resumed.’23  
However, Greif’s interpretation of this case is questionable. The letter, written 
by Abūn b. S adaqa in Jerusalem to Hayyim b. ‘Ammār al-Madīnī in Alexandria, reads 
as follows:24 
 I am writing you my master, mentor and excellency, may the Lord 
grant you a long life and perpetuate your well-being and happiness, from my 
home in Jerusalem, may she be rebuilt, in the middle of Adar One, 
simultaneously with the arrival, by the life of Jerusalem, of your esteemed 
letter. I am amazed that it took one and a half months to get here. I learned 
from it something that shook and grieved me, i.e., the death of your son, may 
God in His mercy glorify his spirit and bless you with the survivors. May He 
prevent you suffering another loss and remember your grief. Bless Him. One 
cannot evade God’s decree, no one can by any means redeem his brother, nor 
give to God a ransom for him. In the end, he who dies these days fares better 
than the living, in view of (prevailing) troubles and hardships. Only the 
virtuous have merit in the Lord’s eyes, and he is the one and only God.  
 I have read your esteemed letter from beginning to end. As to your 
affirmation that you were ashamed of my letters, which are undoubtedly in my 
handwriting, and which you had your friends and mine read, may God 
preserve them: He who knows all secrets, the king of kings, to whom we 
present our complaints and whom we ask for help, He who is able to come to 
                                                 
21
 These are discussed in Greif (1989b), 868-71. They are referred to again in Greif (1993), 530-1; and 
in Greif (2006), 66-71. 
22
 Greif (1989b), 868-9. 
23
 Greif (1993), 530. 
24
 Letter dated 17 March 1055. The original document is in the Taylor-Schechter Collection, 
Cambridge University, with shelfmark TS 13J 25.12. English translation, from the Hebrew version in 
Gil (1983b), published in Simonsohn (1997), No. 105, 209-12. 
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the rescue and reveal the truth, and to hide to evildoers that which has been 
hidden in the past. No one has been as repudiated as much as I have been, and 
has been put in jeopardy as much as I have.25 It came to pass that if someone 
had said [missing words] five by five,26 he would have been told: Abūn 
consumed the money of the North African.27 And if I had greeted somebody, 
he would have replied: you owe money to the authorities. Everyone would say 
it in his fashion. One would say: a hundred, and the other: five hundred. These 
days, since the death of our head (The Gaon, R. Joseph b. Solomon 
Hacohen)28 it became a thousand. Everyone says in Hebrew: a thousand gold 
coins. Praised be He who deliverest the poor from him that is too strong for 
him. Things came to such a pass that if they had appointed an administrator of 
estates he would have been applied to over this every week.29 This is notorious 
and incontrovertible evidence, may the Lord preserve you, even more than the 
letters undoubtedly in my handwriting. After all, a thousand gold coins are 
more than 15 or 16 dinars. He who contrived this may God show me his 
leprosy and poisoning and keep me alive until they are visited upon him. I 
believe that this will come to pass, God willing. Because our sages said: He 
who suspects the innocent suffers bodily punishment. R. Josi said: I had rather 
be one of those suspected without reason. Woe and sorrow unto the wicked.30 I 
was amazed at R. Nahray, may the Lord protect him, whom I have written and 
people tell me that he received my letters, for not answering me. One may 
excuse him (on the grounds) that he does not want to risk the condemnation of 
an answer. All I want is that he receives my letters and reads them, even if he 
does not want to take the risk of answering them. I was even more amazed at 
your letter, because of the falsehood that you treat me to. You portray me as 
your enemy and bring up my handwriting against me, and again you present 
me as if I were a mediator. Woe and sorrow, time and again, who lives in an 
age which God corrupted completely, because there is no one left who will 
mediate a conflict, reform customs and put things in order. We exemplify (the 
biblical verse): None considering that the righteous is taken away from the evil 
to come. And I, may the Lord grant you a long life, the most insignificant of 
all, fulfil my duties like all Jews. As to your being ashamed of the writing 
which no one denies is my own, since it is known to all in Jerusalem, may God 
ban the person who wrote you solely on the strength of what he heard in the 
head’s court, in the manner in which one reports news. I cannot now answer 
you in detail, because you have made me adversary with all your clever 
behaviour and conduct. The antagonist does not act as adviser, guardian or 
witness. All he need do is defend himself against accusations. Therefore, may 
the Lord refuse to forgive one who does not make this his chief purpose. 
                                                 
25
 Goitein (1988), 303, has: ‘No one has ever trod on another man’s blood as that one who caused all 
this did on mine’. 
26
 That is, ‘if someone was discussing something that had nothing to do with this matter’. 
27
 That is, ‘Maghribi elder’ or ‘Maghribi gentleman’ (‘al-sheikh al-maghribi’). 
28
 The Gaon was the highest authority on Jewish law in a particular area. 
29
 Goitein (1988), 303, has: ‘What would have happened , if these rumours had reached the ears of the 
director of finances or the head of the department of estates?’. 
30
 For the previous four sentences, Goitein (1988), 303, has: ‘May God let me see on his body leprosy 
and other plagues, may He not let him leave this world until he will see himself as a leper. I am 
confident that this will happen, if God wills, for our sages, Peace upon them, have said: He who casts 
suspicions on rightful men will be afflicted on his body. R. Yose, Peace upon him, had said; “May I be 
of those who are suspected of something they have not done”. Woe to the wicked forever.’  
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Perhaps I shall find rest for my soul and the Lord will punish the wicked on 
land and sea. I believe that I shall be shot at with arrows, into the eyes (?).  
 I pray that the Lord may preserve you, maintain your well-being, lead 
you and us to a happy end, separate me and you from the wicked, and guard 
you and our souls from everything illicit. Accept, sir, my best wishes and to 
those in your care my best regards, and to all our Maghrebine men, each on his 
way, kindest regards; and to my master Abū Sa‘īd Khalaf b. Salāma the most 
excellent and complete regards. I have written him, but I do not know whether 
he has had the letters. My brother-in-law, master and mentor (Joseph b. Da’ūd 
b. Shaya) Abū‘l A‘lā, may God preserve him, is a friend of his and broadcasts 
his grace. He sends him his greetings and complains that he stopped writing to 
him. I, God willing, will write him later. Because I, by God, wrote the present 
letter in a bitter mood; may God refuse to forgive the wicked. As to me, I cite: 
Let us fall now into the hands of the Lord, for his mercies are great, and let me 
not fall into the hands of men. Praise to Him who performs to me His miracles 
and wonders in His mercy, truly. Indeed, far less is needed to bring one to 
perdition. This is what they meant to do to me. Therefore, woe and sorrow to 
those who do not believe in Him and who do not purify their hearts and 
thoughts and worship Him. It was your duty – because you know me and in 
view of the friendship and the partnership that used to exist between us, thanks 
to God – to believe in my innocence and not to spread the current slanders, 
which have never been proven. God willing, next week I shall force myself to 
write a long and detailed letter to my master and mentor Abū Sa‘īd Khalaf b. 
Salāma. First and foremost I shall complain to him about your behaviour and 
your lack of consideration for a man like me, who was prepared to sacrifice 
himself for you, as you know, may God preserve you. All told, at the behest of 
some person, and because of wickedness and an evil heart, while these 
deplorable times destroy good qualities, the more so [missing words] you 
began to think. God will comfort His people, and farewell. 
 
This letter is quoted in full to demonstrate precisely what evidence it contains. 
Counter to Greif’s claim, it does not show that Abūn was accused of embezzling the 
money of a Maghribi trader. Rather, Abūn was accused of consuming the money of an 
unidentified Maghribi individual, of owing money to the authorities, and of being 
importuned by administrators of estates. Owing money to the authorities was clearly 
not commercial embezzlement.31 Consuming the money of a Maghribi does not 
                                                 
31
 In an effort to rehabilitate his original assertion that this conflict involved embezzlement among 
merchants, Greif (2008), 19, advances the claim that the phrase ‘the authorities’ or ‘the authority’ in the 
statement ‘you owe money to the authorities’ is to be understood as referring to God, and asserts that 
‘the statement should not be taken literally but as a metaphor’. This is apparently based upon a 
speculative interpretation in a footnote by Gil (1983b), vol. 3, p. 220, n. 14. It differs fundamentally not 
only from the translation ‘the authorities’ by Simonsohn (1997), 210, but also from the interpretation of 
this part of the letter by Goitein (1988), 303, who regards it as indicating that rumours had spread that 
  10 
indicate that this is necessarily a case of commercial embezzlement, let alone a 
relationship between long-distance merchants; it could as easily refer to non-
mercantile conflict over personal debts or inheritance. The latter interpretation may be 
supported by Abūn’s reference to being approached by administrators of estates (i.e. 
of inheritances). Goitein’s interpretation is that Abūn had concealed a small sum of 
money left by a countryman to save it for the heirs, because the government 
confiscated the property of foreigners when no heirs were present in the town. 
Rumours then spread that Abūn had robbed the government (not the heirs) of a large 
sum. These rumours reached Hayyim, who was puzzled by them, and thus caused the 
‘excitable’ Abūn to become furious.32 But the key point is that this letter contains no 
details of the accusations against Abūn, apart from that they involve money, the 
authorities, an unidentified Maghribi, and inheritances. It does not show that Abūn 
was accused of embezzling the money of a fellow Maghribi trader. 
This letter does not show that Abūn was accused informally, without being 
charged in court. Quite the contrary. While it is clear that Abūn was the subject of 
informal rumours, it is equally clear that the worst aspects of the accusations against 
him were actually stated in a court of law, since he exclaims, ‘may God ban the 
person who wrote you solely on the strength of what he heard in the head’s court’. Gil 
interprets this text as showing Abūn complaining that ‘his opponents pour abuse on 
him in the Muslim legal institutions’.33 Even if the accusation against Abūn had 
related to commercial contract enforcement, therefore, it was being made not just 
                                                                                                                                            
Abun had ‘robbed the government’. The phrase used means, ‘you have what belongs to the ‘sultān’; in 
Geniza documents, ‘sultān’ can refer specifically to the sultan or his representative, or more generically 
to the secular authorities. Greif does not make clear for what, precisely, he believes ‘you owe money to 
God’ might be a metaphor. 
32
 Goitein (1988), 303. In Greif (2008), 19, the sole justification for describing this unidentified 
Maghribi individual as a merchant is the use of the term ‘alsheikh’ (‘gentleman’). This term is an 
honorific used to refer to any important man, not only to a merchant. 
33
 Gil (1992), 168; see also the editorial commentary on this letter in Gil (1983b), 218-24. 
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through informal rumours but via official administrators of inheritances, and it was 
stated in a formal court of law on at least one occasion. Any informal enforcement via 
the rumours reported in this letter was a supplement to legal institutions, not a 
substitute for them.  
This letter also does not show that rumours about Abūn were disseminated to 
Maghribi traders throughout the Mediterranean, as required for the hypothesised 
coalition. Rumours were circulating in Abūn’s own town (Jerusalem) and in that of 
his correspondent Hayyim (Alexandria). Abūn evidently believed the rumours to have 
spread to another habitual correspondent, Nahray, in Fustat (Old Cairo). This would 
suggest that information was being conveyed to immediate associates of Abūn around 
the eastern end of the Mediterranean – a maximum distance of about 315 miles.34  
This letter does not support Greif’s claim that Maghribi traders as far away as 
Sicily (1312 miles from Jerusalem) cancelled their agency relations with Abūn. The 
only person mentioned as having cut off contact with Abūn is Nahray b. Nissīm in 
Fustat (Old Cairo). There is no evidence that Hayyim himself cut off relations with 
Abūn, in any case, since he was still corresponding with him.35 The only reference to 
Sicily is in the toponym (geographical nickname) of the addressee, whose full name is 
‘Hayyim b. ‘Ammār al-Madīnī, named for madīnat Siqilliyya’; according to Gil, 
                                                 
34
 From Jerusalem to Alexandria is 315 miles; from Jerusalem to Cairo is 265 miles; from Alexandria 
to Cairo is 112 miles. See http://www.convertunits.com/distance/. 
35
 The claim advanced in Greif (2008), 20-1, that Abū Sa‘īd Khalaf b. Salāma (in Alexandria) had also 
cut off relations with Abūn, stretches the evidence. All Abūn says is that he and his brother-in-law have 
written to Khalaf but have not yet heard back from him. Such expressions of concern are a constant 
motif in Maghribi letters – not surprisingly, given the difficulty of the mails, discussed in Section 3 
below – and cannot be regarded as evidence of ostracism. Greif also claims that Abūn’s request that 
Hayyim to send his regards to ‘all our friends, the Maghribi travelers, each one by name’ was unusual, 
and hence constitutes evidence ‘that Abun was subject to multilateral response’. This is not borne out 
by the documentary evidence. Thus, according to Goldberg (2008), 50 fn 84, although there is no 
evidence of a closed Maghribi traders’ coalition, and no instance can be found in which a merchant 
requests a task specifically of a ‘Maghribi’, nonetheless ‘merchants of Maghribi origin dwelling outside 
Ifriqiyya sometimes ask to be remembered to their Maghribi colleagues in their letters, request news of 
them, or report well-wishes’; for examples of such requests, see Goldberg (2005), 177 with fn 161-4. 
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‘madīnat Siqilliyya’ means ‘the city of Sicily, i.e., Palermo’.36 Hayyim was the 
merchants’ representative in Sicily, but at the time this letter was written he was in 
Alexandria (Egypt), and there is no evidence that details of this dispute reached 
Sicily.37 This letter thus provides no evidence of collective punishment and no 
mention of information reaching distant destinations such as Sicily. 
Finally, the letter does not support the claim that collective punishment 
resulted in compromise and the payment of compensation. Greif supports this 
assertion by footnoting three of the seven surviving letters of Abūn reproduced by 
Gil.38 One of these is Abūn’s 1055 letter, reproduced in full above, which does not 
accept that the accusations made against him were justified and makes no mention of 
compromise or compensation. The two other letters, dated 1059 and 1064, do not 
even mention this conflict, let alone any act of compromise or compensation. Four 
further surviving letters by Abūn, dated 1064-5, also make no mention of this conflict. 
This raises the question of the basis on which Greif makes his assertion that collective 
punishment by the Maghribi coalition led to compromise and compensation.  
The case of Abūn b. S adaqa thus provides no support for Greif’s hypothesised 
coalition. It does not show that Abūn had embezzled from another Maghribi trader – 
the only details of the conflict relate to the authorities and to inheritance. It does not 
show that Abūn was accused informally without the involvement of formal legal 
institutions – rumours were conveyed about Abun precisely because of what one 
informant had heard in the court of the Nagid. The case does not show that 
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accusations were disseminated to Maghribi merchants as far away as Sicily – the 
rumours were known in three locations within a 315-mile radius, there is no evidence 
the news reached Sicily, and only one merchant temporarily cut ties with Abūn. It 
does not show that coalition pressure forced Abūn to compromise or pay 
compensation – neither is ever mentioned and the conflict (along with any ostracism) 
had disappeared within four years. 
The second case cited by Greif also fails to substantiate the existence of his 
hypothesised coalition. This is the complaint by Samh ūn b. Da’ūd in Qayrawān 
(Tunisia) that Yūsuf b. ‘Awkal in Fustat (Egypt) had failed to comply with his request 
to pay two of Samh ūn’s creditors in Fustat, or even to inform them of his request to 
pay them.39 Yūsuf apparently failed to pay the creditors because he believed Samh ūn 
had personally profited from sending Yūsuf’s goods to Spain, thus justifying his 
withholding sums owed to Samhūn. Samhūn says that his creditors’ ‘letters 
vituperating me have now come here to everyone and my honor has been disgraced’.40 
This case shows that a bilateral punishment mechanism operated – Yūsuf imposed 
sanctions on Samhūn – supplemented by Samhūn’s concern about harm to his 
reputation in the eyes of his creditors in Fustat and his fellow traders in Qayrawān. 
However, it does not demonstrate the existence of a coalition as proposed by Greif. 
The coalition hypothesis requires information to be conveyed to, and collective 
sanctions imposed by, all members of the group. This case does not show that 
Samh ūn’s failure to pay was known to Maghribi traders in any other Mediterranean 
trading centres: rather, information was disseminated only to individuals in the 
locations of the conflicting parties and sanctions were limited to unpleasant gossip in 
the immediate social circles of the two parties. As we discuss more fully in Section 5, 
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behaviour of this type is extremely widespread in historical and modern economies, 
and is not special to the Maghribis. For example, Macaulay notes for twentieth-
century American businessmen that ‘social networks serve as communication 
systems. People gossip, and this creates reputational sanctions.’41 Informal sanctions 
of this form do not provide evidence that the Maghribi traders operated a coalition. 
It might be argued that it is too demanding to require evidence to support a 
pure form of the coalition hypothesis. But what is the alternative? To regard the 
coalition hypothesis as corroborated by any evidence of reputation-based contract 
enforcement using stronger sanctions than those based solely on purely bilateral 
relationships is surely not demanding enough. Viewed soberly, all that this case 
suggests is that the Maghribi traders were, in certain circumstances, able to use 
reputation-based contract-enforcement mechanisms that, by employing some 
sanctions based on a social network, fell somewhere between the two extremes of 
pure bilateral enforcement and collective enforcement. But merchants in most 
economies do precisely this – they mobilize gossip and reputation to put pressure on 
business associates.42 This practice cannot be portrayed as a distinctive institutional 
mechanism used solely by the eleventh-century Maghribis to take the place of formal 
contract enforcement. 
The third case cited by Greif also fails to provide any evidence of a coalition. 
Greif treats a letter from Maymūn b. Khalfa in Palermo (Sicily) to Nahray b. Nissīm 
in Fustat (Egypt) as showing that Maghribi traders would participate in collective 
punishment even when they believed that the trader being punished was honest. In 
this letter, Maymūn made clear his belief that a certain trader in dispute with Nahray 
had in fact behaved correctly, and pointed out to Nahray that ‘as you know, he is our 
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representative and (this matter) worries all of us’.43 Greif argues that this statement 
shows that Maymūn feared that an explicit accusation against the trader would harm 
his relations with that trader because he would then have to participate in a collective 
punishment imposed by all Maghribis.44 But there is no evidence in Maymūn’s letter 
to support this interpretation.  
A more plausible reason for Maymūn’s statement that the conflict was a 
matter of concern to ‘all of us’ derives from the role of the merchants’ 
‘representative’. The ‘representative’ (wakīl) of a group of merchants in a particular 
location performed a number of useful functions for traders who could not attend to 
their business in person.45 These included solving warehousing and payment transfer 
problems and selling other merchants’ goods on a commission basis if no other agent 
was available.46 A false accusation that the Maghribi traders’ representative in 
Palermo had cheated Nahray would obviously be of concern to all Maghribi traders, 
including Maymūn, because it would raise unfounded questions about the probity of 
someone who performed a number of important economic services for them. The 
statement that an accusation against him ‘worries all of us’ does not provide evidence 
that an accusation against any Maghribi trader would result in all Maghribi traders 
punishing him even when they believed him to be honest. 
The fourth case cited by Greif is a letter from Khallūf b. Mūsā in Palermo 
(Sicily) to Yeshū‘ā b. Isma‘īl in Alexandria (Egypt).47 Khallūf’s letter explained that 
he had sold Yeshū‘ā’s pepper at a lower price than his own pepper, ‘but, brother, I 
would not like to take the profit for myself. Therefore I transferred the entire sale to 
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our partnership.’48 Khallūf’s letter finished by asking Yeshū‘ā to settle accounts so 
that their partnership could be ended. Greif argues that Khallūf’s reason for sharing 
the profit cannot have been the maintenance of his reputation with Yeshū‘ā, since 
Khallūf wished to end the partnership, and hence his motive must have been to 
maintain his reputation with other coalition members. But this is pure speculation: the 
letter contains no evidence that this is the reason for Khallūf’s decision. Quite the 
contrary. Immediately after writing that he has transferred the sale of pepper to the 
partnership, Khallūf writes, ‘may God reward me for what I do for other people. I do 
not expect gratitude from men.’49 This statement suggests that Khallūf did not transfer 
the sale to the partnership in the expectation of receiving the benefit of maintaining 
his reputation with other Maghribi traders.  
Khallūf’s decision to share the profit should be interpreted, rather, in the light 
of the rest of the letter, in which he levels numerous complaints against Yeshū‘ā. 
Khallūf evidently wished to end his business relationship with an unsatisfactory and 
difficult partner, but expected that doing so would not be straightforward. As Goitein 
points out, the termination of a Maghribi partnership was generally a long and 
complex matter, sometimes lasting years, imposing complicated conditions, and 
involving many legal steps in front of the Muslim authorities followed by a formal 
statement before a Jewish court that the parties no longer had any claim against one 
another.50 A more plausible reading of Khallūf’s decision to share the profit is that he 
wanted to minimise the complications involved in ending the partnership. He may 
also have expected that Yeshū‘ā would not make the ending of the partnership simple, 
because Yeshū‘ā was known to be a difficult character51 – hence Khallūf’s remark 
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that he did not expect gratitude from men. This interpretation is supported not only by 
the evidence in the rest of the letter, but also by the fact that the partnership did not 
end after Khallūf wrote this letter requesting that it be wound up. Instead, it continued 
for several years, and was terminated only when Khallūf sued Yeshū‘ā in a court of 
law. Khallūf was right to expect that ending his business relationship with Yeshū‘ā 
would not be a simple matter.52 This case cannot, therefore, be regarded as 
substantiating the view that reputation with all members of the putative coalition was 
important for individual Maghribi traders. 
The fifth example cited by Greif in support of his hypothesised coalition is that 
of Yah yā b. Mūsā al-Majjānī of al-Mahdiyya (in Tunisia). According to Greif, in 
1041-2 ‘a trader from Fustat accused his Tunisian agent [Yah yā] of having failed to 
remit the revenues from a certain sale. As a result of the accusation, so the agent 
complained, “the people became agitated and hostile to [me] and whoever owed [me 
money] conspired to keep it from [me]”.’ Greif claims that this case corroborates his 
coalition hypothesis because it shows ‘the economic nature of the punishment 
imposed upon a cheater by the members of the coalition and reveals why coalition 
members participated in punishing a cheater’.53  
But this interpretation does not hold up to closer examination of the document 
to which Greif refers.54 This is a letter written in 1040 by Yah yā (based in the 
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Tunisian trading centres of al-Mahdiyya and Qayrawān) to his former apprentice and 
current business associate Abu ‘l-Khayr (based in Fustat, Egypt).55 Yah yā relates how 
his father had recently died and people were demanding payment from him (Yah yā) 
for matters about which he had no knowledge and involvement. Yah yā had reported 
this to the Nagid (head of the Tunisian Jewish community) who knew the facts and 
reassured him of his protection. But then an Egyptian creditor called Abu ‘l- Tayyib 
sent a power of attorney to a man in Qayrawān to bring legal action against Yah yā. 
Unfortunately the recipient’s brother took delivery of the power of attorney and 
‘showed it to everyone’.56 It was this which gave rise to the frenzy of hostility to 
Yah yā, translated somewhat differently by Goitein than by Greif: ‘the people became 
agitated and hostile to me, and whoever owed the old man [Yah yā’s deceased father] 
anything conspired to keep it from me’.57 However, the receiver of the power of 
attorney then submitted the legal document to the dayyān (Jewish judge), who 
validated it and ‘stopped the affair’.58 Yah yā asks his correspondent in Fustat to keep 
an eye on what is going on with these matters there, to reassure people under oath on 
his behalf, and to be assured for his own part that he (Yah yā) is willing to honour the 
court judgment in any legal suit against him.59 Goitein interprets a somewhat 
ambiguous passage in the letter as constituting a statement by Yah yā that he hopes he 
will not be forced ‘to apply to a Muslim court or another Muslim authority’.60 
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This letter thus provides no evidence for the existence of a merchant coalition 
or for informal punishment of an agent who has cheated his principal. The brief frenzy 
of hostility and non-payment experienced by Yah yā did not arise out of an agency 
relationship at all, but rather out of a debt claim concerning which we know only that 
it emanated from the affairs of Yah yā ’s deceased father. The event that triggered the 
frenzy of hostility was not information transmission within an informal coalition of 
Maghribi merchants but rather the arrival of a formal legal instrument, a power of 
attorney, to bring legal action against Yah yā. The frenzy of hostility died down when 
the power of attorney was taken to a judge. The case continued not through any 
informal coalition but by formal legal action in Jewish courts, with application to a 
Muslim law-court mentioned as a possibility. Yah yā’s Egyptian creditor had elected 
to undertake formal legal action, as shown by his sending a power of attorney, and 
Yah yā himself explicitly expresses his willingness to submit to legal action, writing 
that ‘if they want to sue me, I shall honor the decision of the court and do what is 
imposed upon me, for my only wish is to be cleared’.61  
The agency conflict referred to by Greif did exist, although it did not give rise 
to the passage he quotes. Yah yā’s deceased father had conducted a number of 
business ventures with a Fustat merchant called Ya‘qūb b. Ibrahīm b. ‘Allān, and 
Yah yā inherited responsibility for these ventures when his father died. We know 
about this from a document of 1041-2 (not footnoted by Greif), a draft speech by Ibn 
‘Allān for a legal appeal against Yah yā in ‘the permanent court of Fustat’.62 In this 
draft speech, Ibn ‘Allān provided a detailed decription of various joint ventures with 
Yah yā ’s father four years earlier, described how they were continued by Yah yā after 
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his father’s death, and claimed that Yah yā had rendered inaccurate accounts and failed 
to pay what was owed. Ibn ‘Allān also described in detail the legal procedures which 
he had been undertaking against Yah yā – how he had appealed to the permanent court 
of Fustat on previous occasions against Yah yā, how he had proved the injury Yah yā 
had done to him ‘with well-confirmed documents and honest witnesses’, how he had 
asked the Fustat court to ‘forward your findings to Qayrawān for the information of 
the court of Hananel [the chief Jewish judge there]’, and how the Fustat court had 
provided a written record of its findings for him to show in the court in Qayrawān.63 
He stated explicitly that he decided to use Jewish and gentile (i.e. Muslim) legal 
mechanisms because of the failure to reach an out-of-court settlement: 
I had also thought that this [Yah yā] would reconsider the affair and return to 
the right way ... so that I would not be forced to make known his doings to the 
communities of Israel in east and west, and in particular to the community of 
Jerusalem and the head of the high council there. I had hoped that he would 
spare me from disclosing my situation in the meetings of the gentiles and to 
their judges.64 
 
Thus Ibn ‘Allān was pursuing this agency conflict against Yah yā in 1041-2 
just as Abu ‘l- Tayyib had pursued his debt case against Yah yā in 1040 – through 
formal legal procedures. To the extent that informal rumours or sanctions made an 
appearance at all in these two conflicts, they were in the context of the use of legal 
mechanisms by Maghribis. In the 1040 conflict with Abu ‘l- Tayyib, general hostility 
and unwillingness to make payments to Yah yā were evoked by the appearance of the 
formal legal instrument of the power of attorney, through which Yah yā was to be sued 
in court. In the 1041-2 conflict with Ibn ‘Allān, the possibility of spreading rumours 
about Yah yā in the wider community was mentioned side-by-side with reporting him 
to the head of the high council of Jews in Jerusalem and to the Muslim authorities and 
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judges. Neither of the disputes in which Yah yā was involved provides any evidence of 
agency conflicts being solved through an informal Maghribi traders’ coalition. 
Instead, both conflicts show Maghribi traders relying primarily on legal contract 
enforcement. Rather than accusations being levelled and punishments being imposed 
informally by a coalition of Maghribis, all Jews, as well as gentiles (and their courts) 
were involved. Moreover, these cases clearly demonstrate that the legal system was 
regarded as capable of enforcing debt claims and agency conflicts among merchants 
not just within the same local area but across the long distances involved in the 
Maghribis’ international trading activities, since Qayrawān and Fustat were some 
1300 miles apart.  
These five cases contain no evidence of collective sanctions being imposed on 
any opportunist by the entire group of Maghribi traders. A form of punishment based 
on the existence of a social network, no different from that practised in many other 
commercial economies, historical and modern, does appear to have been used in some 
of the cases, but it involved the limited transmission of information to a narrow range 
of locations and social groups, primarily those directly associated with the conflicting 
parties. The claim that the Maghribis used the institution of the coalition to enable 
long-distance trade cannot, therefore, be sustained on the basis of these five cases. 
Some of the cases do, however, provide clear evidence that the legal system played a 
significant role in contract enforcement among the Maghribi traders, in sharp contrast 
to Greif’s claim that the inadequacies of this system as a contract enforcement 
mechanism required the use of the hypothesised coalition. 
Are there other ways of arguing that the Maghribis used a coalition to enforce 
contracts in long-distance trade, despite the absence of any direct evidence that they 
did so? We consider this question in the next section. 
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3. Further Aspects Of The Coalition Hypothesis 
 
To assess the plausibility of the claim that the Maghribi traders enforced 
contracts by means of a coalition, it is useful to consider what economic theory 
suggests is necessary for such a mechanism to operate. When repeated interactions 
between the same two parties are rare, but members of a well-defined group interact 
repeatedly with other group members, although not with the same specific individuals, 
it is theoretically possible for contracts to be enforced informally within the group if 
all members have an incentive to punish any member who misbehaves. Greif uses an 
efficiency wage model with complete information to explain why all Maghribi 
coalition members might have had incentives to boycott a member who misbehaved.65 
In this model, merchants hire agents to provide trade-related services, and agents can 
behave opportunistically. Given that all hiring decisions are made in the framework of 
the coalition, the uncoordinated actions of member merchants can result in an 
equilibrium in which it is cheaper to hire an agent who has not behaved 
opportunistically than one who has. Hence all members strictly prefer to hire agents 
who have not misbehaved, i.e., each coalition merchant has an incentive to impose the 
collective punishment required by the coalition mechanism.66 An opportunistic agent 
will be punished by never being hired again by any Maghribi. 
Greif’s theoretical model has some limitations as a basis for analyzing 
Maghribi contract enforcement. One is that business associations between Maghribi 
traders almost never involved one party paying a wage to an another, and thus the 
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empirical basis of the model is doubtful.67 Instead, Maghribi business associations 
typically involved traders reciprocally performing trade-related services for each 
other. But this means that opportunism on both sides was possible. Harbord (2006) 
has extended Greif’s model to allow for opportunism on both sides, showing that, 
depending on parameter values, collective punishment can still be an equilibrium 
without requiring a positive wage, because both parties can act opportunistically 
towards their current trading partner. However, the conclusion that no wages are paid 
is not a general one but depends on suitable parameter values holding. 
Another limitation of Greif’s model, as Harbord points out, is that collective 
punishment can only be an equilibrium if one assumes either that all merchants can 
observe opportunism by any agent or that merchants can change agents costlessly. 
Neither assumption is compelling. Harbord shows that if Greif’s model is extended to 
allow opportunistic agents to be punished by having to pay compensation rather than 
being permanently ostracized, then collective punishment can be an equilibrium 
without either of these unpersuasive assumptions. Allowing for compensation also 
permits the model to accommodate a small amount of uncertainty as to whether the 
agent has actually acted opportunistically or has alternatively been subject to 
exogenous risks such as shipwrecks. Unfortunately, however, there is little historical 
evidence to justify extending Greif’s coalition hypothesis by allowing the informal 
contract enforcement mechanism to include the payment of compensation.68 
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Kandori (1992) offers a more general theoretical model of collective 
punishment as a method of enforcing contracts when there are repeated interactions 
between members of a well-defined group. He considers a repeated Prisoners’ 
Dilemma game played by different pairs of players drawn from the group. In each 
individual play of the game, there is an incentive for both players to act 
opportunistically, in which case the outcome is mutually harmful. Kandori shows that, 
even though a given pair of players is highly unlikely to interact more than once and 
there are incentives for opportunism on both sides, collective sanctions can sustain 
mutually beneficial outcomes under weak conditions, provided only that a costless 
mechanism accurately processes and transmits some information about group 
members. When interacting with another group member, an individual does not need 
full information about the entire group, but just an accurate summary statistic of the 
other’s past actions (i.e. his ‘reputation’). Thus the key informational requirement for 
a coalition-style contract enforcement mechanism is that accurate information about 
each member’s reputation be costlessly transmitted to all group members. 
The letters Maghribis wrote to each other did contain a lot of information 
about trade in different locations. But it is difficult to believe that they communicated 
information to all Maghribi traders quickly and accurately enough to meet the 
requirements for effective imposition of collective sanctions. Communications in the 
eleventh century were slow. Since the Maghribi traders’ operations covered the whole 
of the Muslim Mediterranean, from Spain to Syria and Palestine, it would take many 
months for information about the opportunistic behaviour of a trader to be 
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communicated to all members of the group.69 Goitein portrays contacts between 
Maghribis at the western and eastern ends of the Mediterranean as distant.70 The 
difficulty of communications is illustrated by the case of one young merchant active 
in Jerusalem who, despite being an ‘eager letter writer’, was unsure whether his 
brother and father back in southern Spain believed ‘that I am still alive’.71 In another 
example, two brothers in Algeria wrote a letter to a third brother in Jerusalem a full 
year after he had died.72  
Even over shorter distances, the postal infrastructure extended westward only 
as far as the central Mediterranean (Tunisia and Sicily) and in the Levant only from 
Egypt to Aleppo. There was no regular way of getting letters from Egypt to Spain in 
the eleventh century; any news had to be carried by individual travellers. Thus only 
limited parts of the Maghribi trading area were covered by couriers and the 
commercial mail service. Within these parts, most letters arrived on a predictable 
schedule, but even then delays could last for months. Merchants sent multiple copies 
of letters to insure against loss and nonetheless often lamented long gaps in news from 
regular trading destinations.73 Even between the major nodes of Fustat (Egypt) and 
Qayrawān (Tunisia), important information about major merchants was not always 
communicated swiftly or universally, as shown by a serious conflict between the 
merchant houses of Tahīrtī and ‘Awkal, in which the Jewish elders of Qayrawān 
questioned one of the Tahīrtī brothers about why his brother in Egypt was withholding 
money from the powerful Fustat merchant Yūsuf b. ‘Awkal, clearly ignorant of the 
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fact that the Tahīrtī brothers had been complaining about Ibn ‘Awkal’s negligence in 
transferring communal moneys and correspondence for some considerable time.74 
Were the information requirements of the coalition mechanism really satisfied in a 
context in which communications, even on important issues, were so slow and 
incomplete? Greif’s recent claim that the fast communications of the Maghribi 
merchants are demonstrated by the fact that ‘the Maghribis quickly coordinated a 
successful embargo on Sicily’75 does not hold water. No evidence exists that such an 
embargo was organized, whether quickly or otherwise.76   
It might be argued that it does not matter if information travels slowly, as long 
as the eventual collective sanctions are sufficiently severe. This would be a reasonable 
argument if there were evidence of eventual collective sanctions. But, as we have 
shown in Section 2, there is no such evidence. 
Information transmission must also be accurate, for a coalition-style contract 
enforcement mechanism to work. Bernstein shows that the informal collective 
sanctions used in the modern diamond and cotton industries rely on mechanisms 
(arbitration boards and tribunals) that evaluate competing claims about opportunism 
before demanding sanctions from industry members not directly involved in a 
dispute.77 But Greif’s description of the putative Maghribi coalition does not include 
any neutral mechanism for assessing claims about opportunism, and there is no 
evidence that the Maghribi traders had an informal mechanism for this purpose. 
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On the contrary, there is plentiful evidence that the information conveyed 
among Maghribi merchants was not universally believed to be true. Whether because 
of communication delays, varying trading contexts, or false accusations, Maghribi 
traders’ letters confirm the truism that there were two sides to any dispute between 
business associates. In one letter, competitors accuse a merchant in Fez of interfering 
with the trade of his business associate in Fustat, which the Fez merchant exposes as a 
deliberate plot to disrupt their business relationship.78 In another, the Maghribi 
merchant Zakariyyā b. Ya‘qūb al-Shāma writes that people in Tripoli have been 
saying ‘things which caused me anguish, and things which a person like him [we do 
not know which person] should never have said . . . [May God] humiliate the liars and 
mend their ways’.79 Abū Zikrī b. Qayūma from al-Mahdiyya found himself accused of 
trespassing on the trade of other merchants, and denied the allegation emphatically, 
‘claiming that these are baseless rumors, intended to motivate him to leave the city’.80 
Perhaps the most striking example is provided by a letter dating from the 1020s or 
1030s written by the agent Mūsā b. Ishāq b. Hisda to his principal Yūsuf b. ‘Awkal, in 
which the agent declares in emotional terms: 
I am writing in a state of good health, but with a heart laden with anxiety 
which descended upon me when I read your letter. I would have thought that I 
was held in higher esteem by you than to have you address me so. That you 
should listen to such unjust words from a man like Yûsuf and others from 
whom come base things, and that you should become upset by it! I would not 
have thought that you would accept the words of others against me when you 
know the kind of person I have been and still am. Furthermore, you know my 
lineage. I am not such a one from whom would come such things as to warrant 
your letter.81 
 
Such examples make clear that information about possible opportunism conveyed 
informally among Maghribi traders was far from unambiguous. How could such 
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questionable information, even if it was communicated swiftly, be used to trigger 
collective punishment? Or, if it was so used, how could such collective punishment be 
beneficial for contract enforcement, considering the disputed nature of the information 
on which it was based? 
Given these doubts about the speed and accuracy of the information 
transmitted among the Maghribi traders, it is not surprising that Khallūf b. Mūsā in 
Palermo, writing to his business associate Yeshū‘ā b. Isma‘īl in Alexandria, said that 
‘had I listened to what people say, I never would have entered into a partnership with 
you’.82 Khallūf had clearly not regarded the unfavourable information circulating 
about Yeshū‘ā as being solid enough to prevent the formation of their partnership. 
Greif notes that Khallūf’s remark suggests that he regretted ignoring the accusations 
of other Maghribi traders about Yeshū‘ā, but does not consider the broader 
implication of this remark, which casts doubt on the very existence of collective 
punishment by the putative coalition, since Khallūf had not participated in such 
ostracism (if any were imposed).83 Geniza scholars document additional examples of 
relationships between Maghribi merchants in which accusations of unambiguous 
malfeasance failed to result in ostracism.84 
It might be argued that bilateral sanctions and formal legal contract 
enforcement also require information transmission.85 This is undoubtedly true. But the 
information requirements for these enforcement methods are less stringent, and 
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individual incentives stronger, than for a coalition. Bilateral sanctions or legal 
enforcement require information to travel between two or at most three parties 
(accuser, accused, and – for legal enforcement – the court or judge), not to all 
Maghribi traders throughout the Mediterranean. Moreover, all parties to bilateral 
relationships or court cases have strong incentives deliberately to incur the costs of 
transmitting information, since it affects them directly. This contrasts with the 
hypothesised coalition, where the benefits of transmitting information swiftly and 
accurately are widely diffused, and hence low for any uninvolved individual. 
The evidence suggests that the main requirement for the putative coalition to 
operate effectively as an informal contract enforcement mechanism – accurate 
transmission of information about each Maghribi trader’s reputation to all members of 
the group –  was unlikely to have been satisfied. This is consistent with the conclusion 
that emerged from our discussion of the direct evidence for the existence of the 
coalition: there is no evidence of collective sanctions being imposed on opportunists.  
However, Greif claims that the lack of documentary evidence of any collective 
punishment actually operating among the Maghribi traders does not invalidate his 
hypothesis, because ‘punishment is off-the-equilibrium path and rare events are not 
likely to appear in the historical documents’.86 There are theoretical and 
epistemological problems with this assertion. Greif’s collective punishment is based 
on the theory of repeated games. Punishment is indeed off the equilibrium path in 
repeated games, provided that all players can perfectly observe the past actions of all 
other players. However, as we have argued above, the Maghribi traders were almost 
certainly unable to observe perfectly the actions of all other members of the putative 
coalition. In such circumstances, Greif’s claim is incorrect: punishments do occur on 
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the equilibrium path of play.87 The theoretical basis for the claim that collective 
punishment should not be observed because it is off-equilibrium is thus very weak. 
Greif’s claim also has an epistemological problem. If accepted, it would imply 
that one could argue that any institution exists (even if there is no evidence for it) by 
claiming that it is an institution which creates beliefs that obviate the need for the 
institution actually to operate. The lack of evidence for the institution’s existence can 
then always be discounted as demonstrating that the institution is perfectly successful. 
Such an argument undermines the entire basis of empirical social science. Threats of 
what might happen if some behaviour were to take place may indeed sometimes 
prevent that behaviour from occurring. But a convincing claim that the threats are 
actually important in deterring the behaviour requires better evidence than merely the 
absence of the behaviour.88 
A central component of Greif’s hypothesised coalition is the claim that 
Maghribis formed business associations for long-distance trade only with other 
Maghribis.89 But the evidence shows clearly that this was not the case: Maghribis 
formed long-distance trading associations outside their own group.  
Greif acknowledges that evidence of business association between Maghribi 
and non-Maghribi traders exists, but claims that it is rare.90 The basis for his claim 
appears to be the fact that only two of the 97 traders mentioned in the letters of 
Nahray b. Nissīm (the most important Maghribi trader in Fustat in the middle of the 
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eleventh century) were Muslims. It is true that there is only limited evidence of 
Maghribis conducting long-distance trade with non-Maghribis, but this is partly a 
reflection of sample selection bias. As Goitein points out, the archive that provides 
virtually all our information about the Maghribi traders is a Geniza, a synagogue 
storeroom in which all writings which might bear the name of God were supposed to 
be deposited, so ‘it is natural that it should deal mainly with the commercial activities 
of Jews and between Jews’. Despite this sample selection problem, and all the 
practical reasons for coreligionists to travel, work, trade and litigate within their own 
denomination, Goitein concludes that  
the same Geniza letters reveal an astonishing degree of inter-denominational 
cooperation … Partnerships and other close business relationships between 
Jews and Muslims, or Hindus, or Christians were commonplace.91 
 
This conclusion is borne out by Stillman’s study of the letters of the Maghribi 
merchant Yūsuf b. ‘Awkal.  So accustomed was Ibn ‘Awkal to doing business with 
Muslim agents that he corresponded with them in Arabic script (the Maghribis 
typically wrote to each other in Hebrew script).92 It is likely that some of Ibn 
‘Awkal’s Muslim agents were doing relatively straightforward tasks such as 
purchasing and packing flax on his behalf.93  However, Stillman states that  
most of Ibn ‘Awkal's agents were not employees, but rather smaller, and not 
so small, merchants who provided services to the House of Ibn ‘Awkal not for 
any commission, but in order to request similar, reciprocal services from such 
an influential and well-connected business house.94 
 
This strongly suggests that some of Ibn ‘Awkal’s Muslim agents were engaged in 
long-distance trade relationships with him, a conclusion that is supported by the fact 
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that Ibn ‘Awkal’s goods in Alexandria were handled by at least two different Muslim 
agents on different occasions.95  
Gil also documents a variety of business associations between Maghribi and 
non-Maghribi traders. Yūsuf b. ‘Awkal, Gil points out, was also engaged in business 
dealings with Christian merchants in Alexandria.96 Another Maghribi trader, writing 
from Mazara in Sicily, refers to the trading of oil by a partnership of Jews and 
Muslims, and states that he himself has ‘no individual share in this oil; all of it is in 
partnership between me and some Muslims and Jews, people of Sicily’.97 Still another 
partnership between a Maghribi merchant and a Muslim gave rise to a dispute which 
was resolved co-operatively between the Muslim and Jewish law-courts when the 
qādī (Muslim judge) explicitly requested the involvement of the dayyān (Jewish 
judge).98 Gil also refers to a Muslim who was involved in long-distance trade with 
several different Maghribi merchants.99 According to Goldberg, this same Muslim had 
a trading relationship with yet another Maghribi.100  
The clear evidence that Maghribi traders formed long-distance trade 
associations with non-Maghribis provides another reason to reject the coalition 
hypothesis. This is not to claim that Maghribi trade in the eleventh-century 
Mediterranean was primarily based on associations with non-Maghribis, but simply to 
note that such associations, which are inconsistent with the coalition hypothesis, did 
exist. The existence of these associations, combined with the absence of any evidence 
that a coalition existed, suggests that long-distance trade in the eleventh-century 
Mediterranean was not based on collective punishments generated by multi-stranded 
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interactions within the closed network of the Maghribi traders, but rather sustained by 
other contract enforcement methods. We discuss these in the next section. 
 
4. How Did the Maghribi Traders Sustain Long-Distance Trade? 
 
As we have seen, there is no evidence that the Maghribi traders used a 
coalition as an informal contract enforcement mechanism. They did, however, trade 
throughout the Mediterranean during the entire eleventh century, with non-Maghribis 
as well as Maghribis. Evidently they had mechanisms that enabled the contracts 
involved in long-distance trade to be enforced. What were these? 
To answer this question, we begin by noting that the Maghribi traders made 
use of a legal system that was formal and public in the sense that it was not a private-
order institution generated by Maghribi merchants themselves, but rather consisted of 
legal mechanisms that were accessible to the wider population. In the Muslim 
Mediterranean during this period, non-Muslims could bring their cases either to the 
courts of the religious community to which they belonged or to the Muslim legal 
system.101 Thus the Maghribi traders’ first resort was to the Jewish legal system – a 
formal and public set of mechanisms open to all Jews, not just Maghribis or 
merchants, and used for resolving a wide array of issues, not just commercial 
conflicts. But the Maghribi traders also made use of the Muslim legal framework, as 
the Geniza documents reveal. Even in Jewish courts, the legal form of partnership that 
was used as the basis for business associations was typically the Muslim, not the 
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Jewish, one.102 Furthermore, although civil cases were largely brought before Jewish 
courts,  
actions or deeds made before a qādī (Muslim judge) are often referred to. 
Frequently, and for reasons which still need clarification, the same transaction 
was made both before a Muslim and a Jewish court, or one part was brought 
before a public tribunal and a complementary action before a Jewish court.103 
 
Thus if a Maghribi trader failed to secure adequate legal remedy from the Jewish legal 
system, he could then appeal beyond it. Goitein describes how if a Jew failed to pay 
his debts, Jewish court officials would ‘bring him before the government’, going so 
far as ‘to reserve themselves the right to “extradite” him to the Muslim authorities’.104 
A debt dispute between Maghribi merchants could also be ‘brought before the sultan’, 
who evidently also provided formal, public contract enforcement to which Maghribi 
traders sometimes voluntarily resorted.105   
Both in principle and in practice, therefore, the Maghribi traders had formal 
legal mechanisms at their disposal. Did these mechanisms contribute to contract 
enforcement in long-distance trade? 
Consider first the basis upon which Maghribi traders established business 
associations. They did so in two main ways. One involved mutual service agency 
between business friends. The specific term most commonly used by the merchants 
for this form of association was s uh ba, which Goitein translates as ‘companionship’ 
or ‘formal friendship’.106 Such an association was not based on a written contract, and 
involved merchants performing services for each other without being remunerated, on 
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the understanding that an equal exchange of services was required.107 The other main 
way in which business associations were conducted involved formal legal 
partnerships. Such business partnerships were a well-developed legal institution that 
set out formally the various aspects of an economic relationship between contracting 
parties, such as their investments, their shares in profits and losses, and the times at 
which accounts were to be rendered.108  
There is lively debate among Geniza scholars about the relative importance of 
the two types of business association, with some arguing that informal mutual service 
agency was all but universal, while others argue that the role of legal partnership has 
been under-emphasized. Thus Goitein writes that informal cooperation between 
business friends ‘was the main pattern of international trade’ and that such trade ‘was 
largely based, not upon cash benefits or legal guarantees, but on ... mutual trust and 
friendship’.109 At the other end of the spectrum, Gil argues that his corpus of 818 
Geniza merchants’ letters shows that all Maghribi business associations ‘were based 
on a deed formulated by the court, in which the parties of the partnership were 
specified, as were the other conditions’.110 Quantitative estimates also differ. Udovitch 
estimates that in terms of number of transactions, informal business cooperation is 
referred to 15-20 times more often than legal partnership.111 Using a much larger 
sample of letters, Goldberg estimates that in terms of proportion of text, three quarters 
of discussion in merchant letters is devoted to mutual service agency and only one 
quarter to legal partnership, although she points out that this perceived difference may 
arise partly from the fact that the Geniza materials consist mainly of letters, a type of 
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document in which informal cooperation is more likely to be mentioned: ‘If we only 
had contracts, as we do for the European side, patterns of labor service would look 
more similar.’112 Ackerman-Lieberman, too, argues that scholars’ focus on private 
letters and their relative neglect of the legal material in the Geniza papers has 
contributed to an excessive emphasis on informal business associations and an 
unjustifiable dichotomy between informal and formal contract enforcement.113 Geniza 
scholars thus disagree about the ratio between mutual service agency and formal legal 
partnership in actual practice, but most acknowledge some non-trivial use of formal 
contracts.114   
Even mutual service agency did not operate completely independently of the 
legal system. A s uh ba was undertaken between a specific pair of individuals and was 
not typically transferrable to third parties.115 It allowed one of the pair (the principal) 
to initiate a contract unilaterally by means of written instructions in a letter that made 
the other (the agent) responsible for specified tasks, such as selling some goods in a 
particular location and buying others with the proceeds. The agent was free to refuse 
particular tasks, but had a responsibility not to abandon the goods specified by the 
principal. The rights and responsibilities of agency – the legal control over goods that 
one does not own – were clearly defined in both Muslim and Jewish law.116 
According to Goldberg, although a s uh ba was not based on a written contract, 
merchants understood it as a formal relationship, since actions under a s uh ba could 
involve a lawsuit. The principal had no legal redress if the agent did not follow the 
principal’s instructions, but he could sue the agent for either the goods or the proceeds 
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from their sale under the law of agency.117 Thus the absence of a legal document 
setting out the basis for mutual service agency did not mean that such business 
associations took place wholly independently of the legal system. Nevertheless, the 
role of the legal system in providing a basis for mutual service agency was clearly 
smaller than it was for legal partnerships. Hence s uh ba relationships took place 
among Jewish merchants who were regarded by the merchant community as 
trustworthy.118 This network of responsible individuals was referred to by the 
merchants in the Geniza materials as as h ābunā, ‘our associates’ or ‘our 
companions’.119 
Formal partnerships, by contrast, were not only based on legal contracts but 
could also be formed with a wider group of individuals: ‘merchants entered into 
partnerships not only with members of the as h ābunā network, but with Muslim 
merchants and Jewish merchants outside the network’.120 According to Goitein, ‘more 
often than not, informal cooperation was accompanied by one or more partnerships 
concluded between the correspondents, frequently with additional partners’,121 and 
‘informal business cooperation could last for a lifetime, even for several generations. 
Formal partnerships were of short duration in principle and limited to specific 
undertakings ...’.122 Formal partnerships thus often appear to be used within the 
framework of an informal cooperation between two merchants, either to deal with a 
particular joint venture between the two parties, or to accommodate others in addition 
to the two parties in a venture.123 
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The coexistence of such long-term mutual service agencies or ‘formal 
friendships’ with short-term legal partnerships for particular ventures suggests that 
both the legal system and an informal mechanism played some role in Maghribi 
contract enforcement.124 But as described by Goitein this informal mechanism was 
based on repeated bilateral interactions between the same parties, in which any 
opportunism would have resulted in bilateral punishment. This is not the same as the 
coalition mechanism hypothesised by Greif, based on repeated interactions among 
members of a well-defined but much larger group, in which opportunism against one 
member would result in collective punishment by the entire group. 
It was, of course, possible for a Maghribi trader to form business associations 
with many different individuals, so a question that has to be answered is how could 
bilateral punishments be effective in such circumstances? Opportunism by one party 
might end a particular bilateral relationship, but if information about this opportunism 
is not available to others with whom the opportunist can establish a new relationship, 
it is not clear that the ending of the bilateral relationship in question provides enough 
of a sanction to deter opportunistic behaviour. Ghosh and Ray (1996) address this 
question in a model where a form of Prisoners’ Dilemma game is played repeatedly 
between pairs drawn from a group containing two types of player. The first type is 
always opportunist, but the second comprises potential cooperators who may be able 
to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes despite the immediate incentive for 
opportunism. In this model, a player who encounters a new opponent does not know 
anything about this opponent’s previous behaviour: she only knows what actions she 
and her various opponents have taken in the past. Thus in the Ghosh-Ray model no 
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information is available about a new opponent’s reputation, in contrast to the Kandori 
model discussed in the previous section. Players in the Ghosh-Ray model have the 
option of continuing to play old opponents in subsequent repetitions of the game. The 
cooperative equilibrium in this model, if it exists, is one in which pairs of potential 
cooperators form long-term relationships after having successfully revealed their 
types to each other through experimental initial cooperation. The relatively high level 
of cooperation between pairs of potential cooperators after the initial stage is 
sustained by the threat of breaking off the relationship in response to opportunism. 
This threat is credible because of the presence of opportunistic types: a potential 
cooperator who loses such a partner will not automatically find a new one of the same 
type. The presence of a sufficiently large proportion of opportunists is required for the 
cooperative equilibrium to exist: if this proportion is too small, opportunism by the 
potential cooperators will not be deterred. Thus bilateral sanctions could deter 
opportunism by a Maghribi trader who had the possibility of forming associations 
with many different individuals, provided that there were enough traders who would 
always act opportunistically. 
The Maghribi traders’ use of an informal enforcement mechanism based on 
repeated bilateral interactions was facilitated by other aspects of their trading 
arrangements. Transactions were carried out in public. Clerks recorded the details of 
sales and shipments that were opened. But members of the broader merchant 
community witnessed these acts as well.125 These witnesses were often as h ābunā, and 
‘by conducting most actions in front of these witnesses, merchants gave themselves 
access to redress from the Jewish court in addition to that of Muslim courts’.126 
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 The as h ābunā network was clearly an important element in the array of 
contract enforcement mechanisms available to these merchants. But this network is 
very different from Greif’s hypothesised Maghribi traders’ coalition. There is no 
evidence that the as h ābunā network was closed: if a non-member of the network 
established enough individual ties with existing members, he would gradually become 
a member himself.127 According to Udovitch, the as h ābunā network did not constitute 
a group that had any characteristics distinct from the individuals who comprised it: 
Informal business cooperation was a constellation of individual relationships 
whose skeins could tie together a fairly large number of people; but these 
bonds were never expressed in terms of membership of a group abstractly 
defined; rather, groups, insofar as they were defined, were defined in terms of 
individuals.128 
 
Both Udovitch and Goldberg find that the Maghribi traders did not consist of a single, 
cohesive, and well-defined coalition, but rather formed multiple, overlapping 
networks; individual Maghribis also undertook business connections extending into 
different networks.129  
The as h ābunā network, like business networks in many later economies, 
undoubtedly provided some social sanctions that supplemented the bilateral 
enforcement mechanism based on repeated interactions between the same two parties. 
A network member who cheated an associate would be likely to suffer harmful effects 
which extended beyond the sanctions imposed by his victim. But the existence of such 
sanctions is not inconsistent with the legal system also playing a role in contract 
enforcement, especially since, as we have seen, business associations were not 
restricted to the as h ābunā network and a non-trivial share of them were based on 
formal partnerships. 
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There is direct evidence that the Maghribi traders made use of the formal legal 
system as well as informal contract enforcement mechanisms to sustain long-distance 
trade. Maghribi traders complained in Jewish courts against fellow merchants who 
had failed to repay loans, employed Jewish courts to appoint representatives to collect 
debts for them from distant business associates, and called in the Jewish authorities 
when cheques were not honoured. But they also used the broader legal system of non-
Jewish courts, resolving disputes with Muslim trading partners in front of Muslim and 
Jewish judges, making use of Muslim courts to have deeds drawn up recording debts 
owed them by other Jewish traders, and bringing large debt cases involving both local 
and foreign merchants before the sultan.130 Resort to the ‘gentile’ (i.e. Muslim) courts 
was openly envisaged by Maghribi traders suing business partners, as in 1085 when 
Judah b. Moses b. Sighmār issued a power of attorney to Eli b. Yah yā in litigation 
against his business partner Abraham ha-Kohen b. Faraj al-Rahbī, stating explicitly 
that he ‘appointed him [Eli] to make the claim in any court he wants, even with the 
assistance of gentiles’.131 
The use of the legal system alongside other methods of contract enforcement 
is consequently taken for granted by Geniza scholars other than Greif. Goldberg finds 
that ‘merchants threatened action, sent and discussed powers of attorney, prepared 
testimony for hearings, and requested provision of documents [for] upcoming actions 
in just over 5 percent of their letters’.132 Greif has recently made much play with this 
figure, claiming that it supports his view that the legal system was unimportant in 
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Maghribi contract enforcement.133 But in the absence of comparative studies of 
merchant correspondence in other economies, it is impossible to assert that 5 percent 
of Geniza merchant letters mentioning legal proceedings is either very low or very 
high. Would legal action be mentioned in more or fewer than 5 percent of merchant 
letters in European economies such as Italy or Flanders, where merchants indubitably 
resorted to legal contract enforcement – in the 125,549 surviving letters of the Prato 
merchant Datini (1363-1410), for instance, or the 1150 surviving letters of the 
Antwerp merchant Van der Molen (1538-1544)? Without answers to such questions, 
the figure of 5 percent cannot be taken as evidence that the Maghribi traders were 
distinctive in avoiding formal legal contract enforcement.134  
We must also consider the problem of sample selection bias in the Cairo 
Geniza, our sole source of evidence on the activities of the Maghribi traders. Scholars 
other than Greif acknowledge the probability that the Geniza letters under-represent 
the use of formal legal mechanisms and interactions with non-Jewish individuals and 
institutions. As emphasised in separate contexts by Goitein, Stillman, and Goldberg, 
the Geniza archive is likely to under-represent any type of legal conflict recorded in 
Arabic script, which was how such a conflict would probably be described if it came 
before the Muslim courts.135 Goldberg points out that the reliance on personal letters 
for the Maghribi traders but on legal contracts for medieval European merchants 
exaggerates the perceived difference between their patterns of business association, 
and that Maghribi merchant letters under-represented government institutions because 
‘writers took these structures for granted and did not need to devote the same degree 
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of space in their letters to discussing their management as they did for structures they 
maintained themselves’.136 Ackerman-Lieberman goes further, arguing that the almost 
exclusive reliance on letters, and the lack of analysis of legal materials from the 
Geniza, has resulted in an over-emphasis on informal enforcement.137  
In the present state of research, what Goldberg’s quantitative findings – and 
the research of most other Geniza scholars – indicate is that the Maghribi traders took 
for granted the existence of a formal court system to which they could, if necessary, 
take conflicts with business associates that they failed to solve in any other way. This 
is precisely the conclusion Goldberg herself reaches: 
The credibility of this threat [of legal action] is made clear by fragmentary 
records from a number of eleventh-century mercantile lawsuits. ... Perhaps 
most important in this regard is not the evidence of redress of failure, but how 
common the safeguard of witnessing was: discussion and securing of 
witnesses of course appears in nearly every potential lawsuit, and are taken for 
granted in market acts, but merchants requested or surrounded themselves with 
witnesses in many other situations where probity could be at stake, such as 
valuation of goods not sold, or opening of bales lodged in a merchant’s 
warehouse to verify contents.138 
 
The advantages of a court judgment as a last resort if out-of-court negotiations failed 
were explicitly recognized by the Maghribi merchant Ibn Sighmar in issuing power of 
attorney to litigate against his defaulting business partner in 1085: ‘If something can 
be agreed upon outside of court among you ... you should all do it. If not, a court 
judgment would be the most decisive thing.’139 
Geniza scholarship also does not support Greif’s recent claim that Maghribi 
traders’ use of the legal system was involuntary and limited to either inheritance 
conflicts where legal involvement was mandatory or trading relationships with non-
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Maghribis.140 Some legal conflicts were certainly between Jewish and non-Jewish 
business associates, but this merely reinforces the fact that, counter to Greif’s claim, 
Maghribi traders did not form a closed coalition, but rather engaged in long-distance 
trading relationships with outsiders, precisely because they could resort to legal 
contract enforcement if necessary.141 However, other legal conflicts over business 
associations were purely between Maghribi traders themselves, showing that the 
Maghribis also used formal contract enforcement within their own community where, 
if Greif’s postulated coalition had existed, this should not have been necessary. These 
legal conflicts took place while the parties were still alive.142 The most detailed 
surviving case, involving 11 court sessions in the Rabbinical Court of Fustat in the 
1090s, shows that Maghribi Jewish traders used legal proceedings to resolve conflicts 
not just over ownership and division of moneys and goods but also over conduct of 
business associations.143  
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 The Maghribi traders therefore used both formal and informal contract 
enforcement mechanisms to sustain long-distance trade. The informal methods they 
used included the social sanctions that resulted from the existence of the as h ābunā 
network, but this network was very different from the coalition hypothesised by Greif.  
In addition to informal mechanisms, the Maghribi traders also made use of the legal 
system to enforce contracts when this could not be avoided.  
 Were the Maghribis distinctive in their desire to avoid the legal system if 
possible, and their reliance on informal contract enforcement mechanisms in which a 
social network played an important role? Can it be argued that their contract 
enforcement mechanisms reflected a distinctive ‘collectivist’ culture which hampered 
their subsequent economic development? The next section addresses these questions.  
 
5. Did the Maghribis Have Distinctive Contract-Enforcement Mechanisms and 
Cultural Beliefs? 
 
 
The Maghribi traders are widely used to support the view that cultural beliefs 
determine which economic institutions arise and how successfully an economy 
develops. Greif counterposes the ‘collectivist’ cultural beliefs of the Maghribi traders 
(‘non-Muslims who adopted the values of the Muslim society’) with the 
‘individualistic’ culture of the Genoese merchants (Italians and Christians).144 Despite 
facing the same technology and the same commercial opportunities, he claims, the 
two groups adopted widely differing solutions to the problem of contract enforcement, 
with the Maghribis choosing institutions that provided collective enforcement while 
the Genoese chose ‘legal, political, and (second-party) economic organizations for 
                                                                                                                                            
from Tripoli) over ‘informal commercial collaboration’ supplemented by formal contracts in trading 
ventures to Aden and India, 1090s, in which the principal accused the agent of having ‘sold textiles in 
the Red Sea port of Dahlak, against [his] express instructions’ (33). 
144
 See Greif (1994), Greif (2006), 279, also chs. 3 and 9. 
  46 
enforcement and coordination’.145 This institutional divergence, Greif argues, was 
caused by a divergence in beliefs and values. The informal sanctions which the 
Maghribis used to enforce contracts, he asserts, reflect collectivist cultural beliefs 
which were poorly suited to developing the enforcement methods needed for large-
scale trade and impersonal transactions. Cultural individualism, by contrast, 
supposedly prevented the Genoese from enforcing contracts informally and caused 
them to develop legal enforcement mechanisms, permitting large-scale anonymous 
trade. This in turn, according to Greif, led to long-term economic decline for the 
collectivist Maghribis and economic dominance by the Genoese and their 
individualistic fellow Italians. From this, Greif draws conclusions for the present-day 
less developed world: ‘the Maghribis’ institutions resemble those of contemporary 
developing countries, whereas the Genoese institutions resemble the developed West, 
suggesting that the individualistic system may have been more efficient in the long 
run’.146  
Greif uses his contrast between the ‘collectivist’ Maghribi coalition and the 
‘individualist’ Italian legal system to support his more general propositions about how 
economists should explain institutions, arguing that the ‘motivation provided by 
beliefs and norms ... is the linchpin of institutions’.147 Others have taken up this view, 
with Aoki, for example, defining an institution as ‘a self-sustaining system of shared 
beliefs about a salient way in which the game is repeatedly played’,148 and adducing 
the Maghribi traders as an example of a ‘collectivist’ culture generating institutions 
that render it ‘inferior in its capacity to exploit new exchange opportunities’.149 
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But do the contract-enforcement mechanisms used by the eleventh-century 
Maghribi traders support these wide-ranging propositions? They do not. As we have 
seen, the Maghribis made use of the legal system to register the basis upon which 
long-distance trade ventures were undertaken, and took disputes concerning their 
business associations before courts of law. Of course, as we have noted, there are 
costs involved in using the legal system for contract enforcement and advantages to 
using informal methods where possible. As well as using the legal system, the 
Maghribi traders also used informal methods of contract enforcement, including 
practices involving some degree of sanction based on a social network.  
But Italian and other European merchants in the medieval and early modern 
periods also used sanctions based on social networks to enforce contracts. Byrne 
argues that long-distance traders in twelfth-century Genoa chiefly relied on informal, 
verbal agreements based on mutual trust and personal reputation.150 De Roover 
describes the thirteenth-century Italian merchant houses, indisputably the most 
advanced in their business methods of any in Europe, as favouring business 
relationships among kin and friends precisely because these enabled both parties to 
exert social pressure on one another.151 The business ledgers of the fourteenth-century 
Hanseatic merchant Hildebrand Veckinchusen show him selecting friends and 
relatives as business associates, precisely in order to facilitate the application of 
personal pressure in case of default on contracts.152 Sixteenth-century north German 
merchants, according to Ewert and Selzer, limited their Baltic trade to associations 
within the well-defined and exclusive network of the Hansa so as to enforce contracts 
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through the mobilization of social pressure.153 Seventeenth-century Dutch merchants, 
Gelderblom shows, favoured business deals among personal associates because that 
made it possible to apply social pressure when contracts appeared in danger of being 
broken, and to mobilize the strong non-economic incentives which friends and 
relatives had (and have) to settle disputes amicably.154 Merchants from Genoa and 
other parts of Europe did not rely exclusively on the legal system to enforce contracts, 
therefore, but used a combination of formal and informal methods, including ones 
based on social networks, just as the Maghribis did. It is simply not possible to draw a 
sharp contrast between the contract enforcement methods used by the Maghribis and 
the Europeans. 
The same finding emerges from studies of contract enforcement in modern 
developed economies. Modern economies do not rely heavily on the legal system to 
sustain transactions while abjuring the use of informal methods buttressed by social 
sanctions. Macaulay’s findings concerning contract enforcement in the mid-twentieth-
century USA have been confirmed by subsequent work on this and other modern 
developed economies.155 Business transactions in such economies do contrast with 
those of the Maghribi traders in being typically based on formal contracts, although 
especially for routine transactions the contract does not reflect careful design but 
rather the use of standardised forms. But even in these modern economies, with their 
highly developed legal mechanisms, the cost of litigation and the difficulty of proving 
information in court mean that businesses do not make extensive use of the legal 
system to resolve disputes. Instead, they typically employ informal contract-
enforcement methods, relying on sanctions imposed by the business community: the 
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legal system serves only as a last resort. Macaulay found that disputes between 
businesses about a transaction were more likely to be resolved informally, on the basis 
of repeated interactions over time in which the details of a business agreement were 
modified as events unfolded, than by resort to the formal legal system. An important 
component of these relational sanctions was the desire of both parties to continue in 
business. Each party was concerned both about how the other party would react to any 
dispute, which might mean loss of profitable future business through the other party’s 
ending the association, and about how any dispute might affect its own wider 
reputation. This reputation depended on information circulated to uninvolved third 
parties, and a poor reputation was likely to damage a disputant’s ability to engage in 
future transactions with those third parties: 
 Sellers who do not satisfy their customers become the subject of discussion 
in the gossip exchanged by purchasing agents and salesmen, at meetings of 
purchasing agents’ associations and trade associations, or even at country 
clubs or social gatherings where members of top management meet. ... 
Obviously, a poor reputation does not help a firm make sales and may force it 
to offer great price discounts or added services to remain in business. 
Furthermore, the habits of unusually demanding buyers become known, and 
they tend to get no more than they can coerce out of suppliers who choose to 
deal with them.156 
 
But the relatively infrequent use of the formal legal system to enforce 
contracts did not, in Macaulay’s view, mean that it was unimportant as a means of 
buttressing market transactions. The legal system affected the informal resolution of 
disputes by specifying the parties’ outside options, and was often resorted to when 
relational sanctions could not work because long-term business relationships had 
collapsed.157 It also influenced the norms governing informal dispute resolution: 
‘contract law ... stands for the idea that people should perform their commitments 
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unless they have a very good excuse [and] thus reinforces norms that are common in 
all business communities’.158 These norms acted as an effective non-legal contract 
enforcement mechanism, which were reinforced by personal relationships across the 
boundaries of the two business units involved in a repeated association.159  
So widely replicated are Macaulay’s findings that Granovetter uses them to 
illustrate his influential argument that economic behaviour in modern societies is 
embedded in networks of social relations that have major effects on economic 
processes.160 Individuals and firms that are embedded in social networks risk losing 
these relations if they act opportunistically, so that embeddedness can deter such 
behaviour. 
The extent to which modern economies rely on networks of social relations to 
govern transactions by using mechanisms associated with social attachments has been 
documented in many empirical studies, of which we have space to mention only a 
few. Larson found that strategic alliances between high-growth entrepreneurial firms 
in the USA depended extensively on personal reputations, individual friendships, and 
mechanisms of social control arising from norms of trust and reciprocity.161 Gulati 
reached a similar conclusion in his studies of alliances involving American, European 
and Japanese firms in the new materials, industrial automation, and car sectors. 
Networks provided useful information in forming new alliances and choosing 
partners, and circulation of such information among network members deterred 
opportunistic behaviour:  
These ‘embedded’ relationships … accumulate into a network that becomes a 
growing repository of information on the availability, competencies and 
reliability of prospective partners. … The more the emerging network 
internalizes information about potential partners, the more organizations resort 
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to that network for cues on their furure alliance decisions, which are thus more 
likely to be embedded in the emerging network.162 
 
Gulati also found that alliance agreements became less formal if partners were 
embedded in social networks of previous alliances, suggesting that firms’ 
participation in a network of alliances contributed to the building of trust between 
them.163 Uzzi’s studies of women’s dress firms in New York City and midmarket 
banks in the Chicago area showed that commercial transactions were embedded in 
networks of social relationships which produced beneficial outcomes by promoting 
governance arrangements based on trust.164 
 How do these embedded networks in modern economies compare to the 
Maghribis’ as h ābunā network? According to Udovitch, new members were 
cautiously introduced into the as h ābunā network through the establishment of 
individual ties with existing members.165 Within the as h ābunā network, if a new 
member ‘turned out to be less than trustworthy, all parties had to be informed so that 
future relationships could be adjusted’.166 Networks in modern economies have very 
similar characteristics.  Larson found that the firms she studied saw themselves as part 
of an industry community, within which there was an inner circle of individuals and 
organisations with a very good reputation for business practices and performance: ‘as 
a consequence, affiliation with respected individuals and organizations could lift new 
players into a higher status group of top industry names’.167 Gulati showed that the 
information provided by the network of existing alliance partners was important in 
overcoming the risks associated with forming new inter-firm alliances.168 Uzzi found 
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that embeddedness in the clothing and banking sectors developed from previous 
relationships in which an actor with embedded ties to two unconnected actors 
‘transfers the expectations and opportunities of an existing embedded social structure 
to a newly-formed one, furnishing a basis for trust and subsequent commitments to be 
offered and discharged’.169 In both Udovitch’s analysis of the as h ābunā network and 
studies of embedded economic transactions in modern economies, social networks 
play a very similar role in transmitting reliable information about the performance and 
trustworthiness of individual members to the group as a whole. 
 The Maghribi traders thus did not use contract enforcement practices that were 
fundamentally different from those of merchants in medieval and early modern 
Europe, or indeed businessmen in modern developed economies. Although 
transactions in modern economies are more likely to be based on a formal contract, 
disputes are often resolved using informal reputation-based methods, in which social 
networks and sanctions play an important role, and the legal system is typically 
employed for such purposes only as a last resort. The similarities between Maghribi, 
historical European, and modern contract enforcement methods are more striking than 
the differences. 
A final claim about cultural differences advanced by Greif is that European 
‘individualism’ led to the formation of family firms while Maghribi ‘collectivism’ 
instead led to the formation of a broader merchant coalition.170 Greif argues that 
repeated interactions can only sustain informal contract-enforcement mechanisms if 
there is some way to overcome a trader’s incentive to behave opportunistically 
towards the end of his life. In Greif’s view, European merchants overcame this 
problem by establishing family firms, but the Maghribis did so by transferring 
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coalition membership from father to son, so that concern about sanctions being 
imposed on the next generation deterred Maghribi traders from behaving 
opportunistically in old age. Greif portrays family firms as absent among the 
Maghribis, and interprets this as evidence that they preferred ‘collective’ over 
‘individual’ solutions to problems of opportunism.171  
But here too the premise of the argument is false. The Maghribi traders did 
form family firms. Stillman describes how the correspondence of the eleventh-century 
Maghribi merchant Yūsuf b. ‘Awkal shows that ‘as soon as each of his sons came of 
age, they became – so to speak – partners in the firm. Great family business houses of 
this sort are common in the Geniza records for this century.’172 According to Stillman, 
In some respects the House of Ibn ‘Awkal is reminiscent of the fraterne which 
later were to dominate in Venetian business life. Most business undertakings 
were done entirely with the family’s capital. However, as in Venice, some 
business ventures were undertaken on the basis of short-term partnerships with 
others.173 
 
Goitein describes family partnerships between fathers and sons, uncles and nephews, 
and elder and younger brothers.174 In several surviving cases, these partnerships were 
intended to ensure that the family business would outlast the death of one partner and 
survive across the generations, as in the case of Hillel b. Eli around 1090, whose will 
entrusted his brother (who was also his business partner) with administering the 
property of his minor children and expected him ‘to continue the partnership until it 
could be formally reinstated when the orphans came of age’.175 Goldberg finds that a 
large corpus of Geniza merchant letters attests ‘the high proportion of business 
relationships based on close family ties’.176 The Tāhertī family firm of Qayrawān 
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‘ideally exemplify a family business’, according to Goitein, and are described in a 
letter written by an opponent as ‘one band, united by one spirit’.177 Goitein explicitly 
likens the family firms of the Maghribis to those of the medieval Venetians,178 and 
Stillman observes that ‘perhaps the greatest importance of the Ibn ‘Awkal 
correspondence, as far as socio-economic history is concerned, lies in the detailed 
picture that it gives of the organization of a medieval business house which was 
prominent long before the Medici in Florence, the Datini, or Pisani in Venice, the 
Grimaldi in Genoa, or the Arnolfini in Lucca.’179 Furthermore, just as Maghribi 
merchants traded both in the form of family enterprises and as individuals, European 
merchants traded both as individuals and in the form of family firms.180 Evidence on 
business forms used by the two sets of merchants does not support the idea of a 
fundamental cultural divide between them.  
Commercial differences between the Maghribi traders and the Genoese, as 
well as the decline of Maghribi trading between the eleventh and the later twelfth 
century, can be explained without appealing to unobservable cultural differences. For 
one thing, the Jewish merchants in the Muslim Mediterranean lived as a minority 
under the rule of a Muslim Caliph, while the Genoese merchants enjoyed full rights as 
citizens in their own autonomous city-state, with obvious repercussions for the two 
groups’ respective economic privileges, legal entitlements, political influence, and 
relations with the majority population. For another, political and military instability 
increased commercial insecurity in the central Mediterranean from the mid-eleventh 
century on. This caused the Maghribi traders to reduce the geographical scope of their 
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trade and intensify their involvement in intraregional commerce and local industrial 
production.181  The Genoese merchants, by contrast, were protected from commercial 
insecurity by the Genoese navy, partly because merchants were important in the 
Genoese polity. A third reason is that the frequency of merchant correspondence in 
the Fustat Geniza – the sole source of information about the Maghribi traders – was 
reduced in the later twelfth century when the most affluent Jewish merchants moved 
away from Fustat to New Cairo, the seat of the government. Finally, at the beginning 
of the thirteenth century, a powerful association of Muslim merchants, the Kārīmis, 
secured privileges from the political authorities granting it an extensive legal 
monopoly and excluding outsiders from participating in many aspects of trade.182 A 
number of observable characteristics of the constraints facing Maghribi traders thus 
differed from those facing the Genoese and changed over this period, and there is no 
need to appeal to an unverifiable cultural ‘collectivism’ to explain the decline of the 
former and the success of the latter. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This reappraisal of the medieval Maghribi traders has three broader 
implications. First, Greif’s portrayal of the Maghribis’ institutions and economic 
behaviour is untenable. Second, the Maghribis cannot be used to advocate exclusive, 
private-order social networks to enforce contracts and facilitate exchange in 
developing economies. Third, the Maghribis do not provide any foundation for a 
‘cultural’ theory of development. 
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Not a single empirical example adduced by Greif shows that his hypothesised 
coalition actually existed. The evidence shows that the Maghribis, like businessmen in 
many other economies, enforced contracts by using the legal system alongside 
informal mechanisms based on reputation and repeated bilateral interactions. 
Sometimes they sought to supplement informal bilateral mechanisms by using social 
pressure based on a wider group of Maghribi traders, but this was restricted to social 
circles in contact with the conflicting parties and did not remotely encompass the 
entire community of Maghribi traders throughout the Mediterranean. Such use of 
social ties in business relationships is no different from that observed in many 
commercial economies, including medieval Italy, early modern Germany and the 
Netherlands, and twentieth-century America. In not a single case can a coalition in the 
form portrayed by Greif – private-order enforcement of commercial contracts through 
collective punishment by the entire Maghribi community – be observed in operation. 
We must therefore reject the hypothesis that there existed such an institution.  
The Maghribis provide no support for the idea that the ‘social capital’ of 
exclusive, private-order networks offers institutional solutions for contract 
enforcement in developing economies. Other scholars find no support for Greif’s 
claim that merchants of Maghribi descent avoided agency relations with non-
Maghribi Jewish traders and thus constituted a closed social network. Instead, like 
businessmen in most societies, the Geniza merchants formed multiple, overlapping 
networks, and individuals formed agency relations extending into different networks. 
These networks were not closed. Agency relationships existed between Maghribi and 
Muslim traders, precisely because the Maghribis were able and willing to enforce 
contracts in both the Muslim and the Jewish legal system. Like businessmen in most 
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economies, the Maghribi traders avoided litigation if possible, but they did use legal 
mechanisms to resolve conflicts with both Jewish and Muslim business associates. 
Finally, the Maghribis provide no support for the ‘cultural’ theories of 
economic development for which they have been mobilized. Greif’s notion that the 
Maghribis espoused collectivist beliefs in contrast to the individualistic beliefs of the 
Italians is based on two assertions – that the Maghribis chose collective punishment 
through a closed coalition in preference to the Italians’ choice of individualized legal 
penalties; and that the Maghribis chose to transmit coalition membership to sons in 
preference to forming ‘individualistic’ family firms like the Italians. Neither assertion 
is supported by the evidence. Maghribis made voluntary use of legal mechanisms, and 
established family firms that are explicitly described by Geniza scholars as resembling 
(but pre-dating) the great merchant houses of medieval Italy. There is no evidence that 
the Maghribis were inherently more ‘collectivist’ than any other medieval trading 
culture. They cannot be used as the foundation for a cultural theory of development. 
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